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His circles with language 
 reveal themselves ethically grounded,  
his search for philosophical clarity  
as a search for clarity about himself.  
(Somavilla, 1997, p. 8)1 
1. A Methodic Procedure: To see any 
problem from a religious point of view 
This sentence was taken as a methodic procedure for 
investigating philosophical questions regarding scientific 
psychology. To accomplish such a proposal is a very hard 
task to our mentality dominated by a certain mechanical 
way of seeing and thinking the world, specially for psy-
chologists because they do not usually consider their 
problems from a religious point of view, even those relig-
iously oriented. They believe all matters are liable to be 
subject of scientific treatment and never think they are 
working with religious categories and they also do not 
realize that in their scientific theories religious beliefs are 
embedded. Good illustrations of it can be found in the 
ways they deal with both the problem of the self and of the 
self-knowledge; some of them appeal to neuro-physiology 
or psychopharmacology and try to explain exactly the 
immeasurable coordination between mind and brain in-
volved, and others defend psycho-sociological theories. 
The error made by those who research under the neuro-
physiological perspective is the attempt of approaching 
scientifically something which is not a scientific but a phi-
losophical problem, as was shown by Drury (1973). And 
those who try to understand the self by coordinating it to 
body and environment ascribe to these the responsibility 
for its settlement and growth. They think of the self as a 
material object whose nature must be discovered through 
the use of mental testing, questionnaires, attitude scales, 
interviews and a whole arsenal of psychological phenom-
ena measurement instruments. Self-knowledge and the 
knowledge of other selves are for them a matter of mas-
tering a technique, anyone an individual can choose 
among the so many existing in the market of psychothera-
pies, these social practices that, in the last resort, aim at 
the revelation and the reconstruction of the patient’s self 
and the achievement of an ideal of self-knowledge.  
All these techniques provided by applied science as 
commodities in the market of psychotherapy could be seen 
from the perspective of the technologies of the self, con-
cept used by Foucault (1980) in his studies about the 
constitution of the subject and the modern concept of the 
self. Through his analysis of the experience of sexuality he 
came to the conclusion that in human societies, beyond 
the three major types of techniques he described before 
(techniques of production, techniques of signification and 
techniques of domination) there is in all societies another 
type of techniques that are created for permitting individu-
als to change themselves putting into effect by their own 
means, a certain number of operations on their own bod-
ies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own 
                                                     
1 This and other quotations from Denkbewegungen here repeated in English 
are a free translation of mine from German. And the number of pages refers to 
the normalized text of the Diaries. 
conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform them-
selves. And all these modifications motivated by the desire 
of attaining a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of 
purity, of supernatural power, and so on (p. 162). 
According to Foucault’s definition, when we investigate 
the self and are in search for self-knowledge we accom-
plish an ascese, the exercise of a technology that requires 
the learning and mastering of certain proceedings of self 
care and which is guided by the ideal of looking for the 
Perfect. And, thanks to him, it seems to me that the study 
of those forms of understanding the subject creates about 
himself could restore in psychological research the interest 
for the original religious dimension of the self. 
When I read Wittgenstein’s Diaries of 1930-1932 (Cam-
bridge) and of 1936-1937 (Skjolden) published under the 
title, Denkbewegungen (1997), I felt I had before me a 
document of his ascese for finding the way to the Perfect. I 
could do nothing but think of these diaries (together with 
the Secret Diary) as his form of spiritual exercises closely 
connected to his philosophical activity. His notes on the 
question of the self and self-knowledge related to his rel-
igious beliefs came out to me as an example of a religious 
way of seeing problems of contemporary psychology. 
According to Foucault’s description (1980), examination 
of conscience and confession are among the most impor-
tant techniques of the self oriented towards the discovery 
and formulation of the truth concerning oneself. Their 
importance is in the fact that for the government of people 
in our societies obedience must not be enough and every-
one is required also to produce and publish the truth about 
oneself (p. 163), in the way these two procedures were 
conceived by pagan philosophers. 
2. The Self and the Perfect 
Wittgenstein’s Diaries (1997) are basically made out of 
these two self technologies. He begins the Diary of Cam-
bridge by declaring that one need a bit of courage in order 
to write a reasonable observation about himself (p. 19). 
And later on, in the Diary of Skjolden he writes: How hard 
is to know oneself, to confess honestly what one is (p. 94). 
The search for perfection can be read in the notes of 
15.3.1937:  
Knowing one’s own self is dreadful because one knows 
at the same time the living demands, &, and one knows 
he is not satisfying it. However, there is no better way of 
knowing oneself than to look for the Perfect. Therefore, 
the Perfect should awaken in men a tempest of resent-
ment; if they do not want to feel completely humiliated. I 
believe the words Blessed, the one that is not angry with 
me means: Blessed the one who withstands the vision of 
the Perfect (p. 95). 
If writing about one own self is a hard task that asks for 
courage and honesty, and if it produces resentment in men 
because they discover before the Perfect that they can not 
satisfy the life demand, however, it is possible to learn 
about one own self and that exists a best way of accom-
plishing this task which is to know the Perfect; being God 
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the coordinated idea. In the development of this thought, 
Wittgenstein (1997) distinguishes two meanings of Perfect: 
in the first meaning it is something entirely other (ganz 
anderes), and in the second, he is a human being; and 
they would correspond to the two different images of God: 
the world creator and the one present in the creature, the 
human being. So, he writes that we hear the sentences: 
God created the world and This man is – God, but we do 
not hear somebody saying that this man created the world 
(p. 95).  
These two meanings of the Perfect are united in Christ’s 
ethics. Because he existed in this world as God’s son and 
as the verb that emanates from God, the entirely other 
whose name is unspeakable, his word is the real ethics. 
And Wittgenstein points out that the use of the expression 
“Christ, the Redeemer” shows he is also understood as 
God. Jesus Christ is a man that is God because he is the 
Redeemer. However, he affirms that it is not possible to 
call him this way without calling him God, because a man 
can not redeem (21.11.1936). Bouwsma (1986) reports 
that in conversations with him Wittgenstein defended that 
Jesus Christ was the only man who could teach ethics, 
that means, give advice to his disciples, because he was 
in some way higher than those he teaches and because 
he suffered with them in respect to those sufferings he was 
to give counsel. And the taught, stresses Bouwsma, must 
confess to him the innermost secrets of his life, holding 
nothing back. This would be the teaching in ethics (p. 46). 
Christ offers the way for searching the Perfect, the pos-
sibility given to man for showing himself also as a son of 
God; and the practice of Christian ethics will put him in this 
path. The love of the Perfect appeared to Wittgenstein as 
the summary of Christian doctrine and in the notes of 6th. 
April, 1937, he exposes an interpretation of it: 
Awake perfectly! By writing this command he begins his 
interpretation showing firstly the consequences of following 
it: If you do this you will recognize you are not good to 
anybody; & this will cease to you the joy you have in this 
world. And it can also no more return if you stay awake. 
After such a terrifying sentence he affirms that a man in 
this condition needs redemption because otherwise he 
would get lost. Since he should stay in life living in a world 
which is dead to him, he would need to live under a new 
light coming from some other place. A light in which can 
not have any intelligence or any wisdom; because to this 
world that man is dead. If a man considers himself as 
dead, he has to welcome the idea of living in another life, 
because on the contrary his life would become pure de-
spair. This other life is described by Wittgenstein as having 
the task of maintaining that man almost suspended above 
this Earth, which means that he walks on the Earth but he 
does not rest more on the Earth and is hung in Heaven 
and not hold up by the Earth. And he concludes the note 
identifying this other life with love and faith: But this life is 
love, the human love, the love of perfection. And faith is 
this love.  
To follow Christian doctrine according to his interpreta-
tion is entering the way for living the life of a saint, the man 
who lives in this life suspended between our world and 
heaven. And Wittgenstein (1997) writes about the many 
doubts and fears he had concerning his capacity of carry-
ing out Christian ethics in such a radical way he interpreted 
it. The most intense inner battle he engaged himself is 
referred to the question of what should command belief: 
consciousness or the Scriptures. So, in 27th. January, 1937 
he wrote that primacy should be given to consciousness 
because being a book, a document, the Bible could not 
obligate him to believe in the lessons it concentrates, and 
he argues that: The belief begins with the very fact of 
believing. One should begin with belief: from words it does 
not follow any faith (p. 98). 
3. The Resistances of a Pure Heart 
Wittgenstein (1997) discussed the resistances he had to 
follow religious commandments. Some of his observations 
in this sense appear out of a reflection about the meaning 
of the liberation through death doctrine. Liberation by 
sacrifice, he argues, could consist in the fact that Christ 
made what all of us want to but can not, and that in faith 
we identify ourselves with him, by the fact we pay the fault 
under a more modest way of acknowledgement.  
During Easter 1937, Wittgenstein (1997) analyzed a 
sentence about the confrontation between acting by faith 
that comes from a pure heart and acting by obedience to 
religious commandments: I want to do it if this will come to 
me from the heart & not because I received a command. If 
the acting comes from the heart, he says, it is not obedi-
ence and not also self-immolation, it is only what comes to 
someone’s heart. This kind of action would not lead to 
death but obedience yes: You will not die. On the contrary, 
you die exactly by obeying an order by pure obedience. 
And acting by pure obedience is an agony that can and 
must be a pious agony. Wittgenstein concludes these 
notes by declaring he understood acting in obedience to 
religious commandments that way and by a confession: 
But I myself! – I confess I do not want to perish, even if I 
understand what is the highest (p. 99).  
After this analysis, Wittgenstein (1997) records that by 
having had these thoughts he slept badly the preceding 
nights, that he felt himself as dead, that he could not work, 
that he had the thoughts confused, and that he was de-
pressed in a sinister way. All of this meant for him that he 
was afraid of certain religious thoughts (p. 99). In another 
entry (28.1.1937), he defends that fear participates as a 
foundation of the psychological meaning of God, because 
it is a basic instinctive reaction. He writes he understood 
what people means when they say that faith brings men 
the blessedness. They mean that faith (and bliss) freed 
from the fear caused by men since it puts them immedi-
ately into God’s service. Man finds himself, let’s say, in the 
vicinity of the Kingdom (p. 73). Being so, fear caused by 
humans would lead people to surrender to the protecting 
superior force of God. 
Wittgenstein (1997) saw in the investigation of the self a 
form of consolation. So, he reports an anxiety that usually 
disturbed his consciousness and that became severe that 
day (13.02.1937) due to the reading of some Kierke-
gaard’s writings. He confess the motive of disturbance was 
that he did not want to suffer, he did not want to renounce 
to any comfort and to enjoyments. For example, he writes, 
I will not fast and I will not also damage myself by eating. 
To this I have added in myself the existence of a lack of 
humbleness impossible of being rooted out. And after such 
a sort of confessions he concludes that this investigation of 
himself was his only way of having consolation. It is as if I 
could do nothing but only find consolation through the 
knowledge of my deplorable nature (p. 77). 
4. After Putting a Good Face on Wittgen-
stein’s Diaries 
These thoughts when presented to psychologists provoke 
in them reactions of uneasiness and it is, in fact, a terrific 
experience the confrontation with our logical and linguistic 
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alienation woke up by reading Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
However, the use of the sentence about seeing all prob-
lems from a religious point of view as a methodic proce-
dure has shown itself useful for revealing realities psy-
chologists do not pay much attention. 
Through the use of this procedure it emerged clearly to 
me, from one side, the idea of an existing unconscious 
network of religious concepts operating as foundations of 
scientific psychological notions that the majority of psy-
chologists have resistance to become aware of and ana-
lyze. From another side, considering we are used to see 
everything not only liable to be subject of scientific treat-
ment but also as merchandise (even the most immaterial 
productions of spiritual life, health care, or well-being), the 
reading of Wittgenstein’s notes on the self and self-knowl-
edge developed to me a portray of a certain form of 
knowledge (the religious-philosophical) that can not be 
bought as if it were a commodity. And by this movement 
another unconscious formation appears and we tread on 
the ground of the political economy that rules the market of 
symbolic wealth exchanges where psychotherapies and 
other technologies of the self circulate.  
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